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1 Introduction
Much of the modern literature on interest rate rules uses New Keynesian
optimizing models that do not include explicit reference to any monetary ag-
gregate (see, e.g., Rotemberg and Woodford, 1997; Clarida, Gal`ı and Gertler,
1999, and most of the contributions in Taylor, 1999). A common feature of
these models is that they specify the demand for output as a function of
the real interest rate. The real money stock does not enter the IS relation.
These models therefore limit the influence of monetary policy to output and
inflation to its effect on the real interest rate. With the nominal interest
rate as the policy instrument, it is not necessary specify a money market
equilibrium condition (see Romer, 2000).
This common practice of neglecting monetary aggregates in monetary
policy analysis has recently been questioned by Meltzer (1999), McCallum
(2001), and Nelson (2002, 2003). In particular, McCallum (2001) points out
that while no explicit term involving money appears in the standard New
Keynesian setup, inflation can still be pinned down in the long run by the
economy steady-state nominal money-growth rate. This steady state role for
money is also discussed in detail by Nelson (2003).
Moreover, McCallum (2000, 2001) analyzes the case in which the re-
sources used by consumers in conducting transactions are modelled by a non
separable function of consumption and real money balances1. Meltzer (1999)
argues that changes in real monetary base generate effects on real aggregate
demand not summarized by the real interest rate on short term securities.
Nelson (2003) emphasizes the role of money in the transmission mechanism
both as a proxy for a whole spectrum of rates of return2, and as an indicator
variable, which contains information about the state of the economy3.
The main purpose of this paper is to give micro-foundations for an ex-
plicit role for money in the transmission mechanism of monetary policy in
the current macroeconomic debate. In particular, we derive a real balance
effect that explicitly enters the IS relation within an optimizing general equi-
librium framework of the New Keynesian-type. According to de Scitovszky
(1941), Haberler (1946), Pigou (1943), and Patinkin (1965), the real balance
effect describes a channel through which a change in real money balances
1Monetary models in which the marginal utility of consumption depends on real money
balances are also developed by Andres et al. (2001), Ireland (2001a), and Woodford (2003).
2This view has been first developed by Friedman and Schwartz (1982).
3The idea that real money balances capture many channels of monetary transmission
is also discussed by Meltzer (2001).
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has an impact on the real financial wealth of consumers and therefore affects
consumption and output. Notably, this effect is not considered in traditional
models. There is, in fact, empirical evidence showing that real monetary
base growth is a significant determinant of consumption and output gap in
both the United States and in the United Kingdom4.
The present paper extends the New Keynesian setup with money-in-
the-utility-function by introducing overlapping generations as modelled by
Yaari(1965)-Blanchard (1985). Money in the utility function is the source
of money demand5. Besides our desire to be able to evaluate the role of the
real balance effect, there are good reasons in basing the demand-side of the
economy on a discrete time stochastic version of the Yaari-Blanchard model.
First, this kind of extension allow us to maintain the main characteristics
of the so-called “New Neoclassical Synthesis”6: forward-looking behavior of
optimizing agents and incomplete nominal adjustment of prices featured in
New Keynesian theories. Second, the derivation of the real balance effect
does not require non-separability in the utility function. Thus, the implica-
tions of this effect are analytically more tractable7. Our analysis attempts
to examine whether the presence of an explicit real balance effect in the IS
relation helps to evaluate the role for money in designing monetary policy
rules.
We examine basic issues related to equilibrium determinacy and optimal
monetary policy. Specifically, we investigate whether it is necessary for mon-
etary policy to overreact to inflation by raising the nominal interest rate by
more than the observed increase in inflation in order to rule out equilibrium
multiplicity. It is shown that the real balance effect makes the rational ex-
pectations equilibrium determinate also under a relatively “passive” Taylor
rule (i.e., that has the long run nominal interest rate to increase by less
than point-for-point with inflation). Our result does not imply that the
real balance effect makes a relatively “passive” monetary policy optimal. In
particular, within a class of policy rules that is constrained to be a linear
function of state variables, we demonstrate that the Taylor principle is more
likely to be verified under commitment rather than discretion. Our analysis
4See Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum (1995), Meltzer (1999), and Nelson (2002).
5Feenstra (1986) establishes an equivalence between money-in-the-utility-function and
cash-in-advance models.
6This term is due to Goodfriend and King (1997).
7For the derivation of the real balance effect in the infinite horizon framework a` la Weil
(1991) with separability in utility, see Ireland (2001b). His analysis shows that the real
balance effect eliminates the liquidity trap.
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gives support to the view that the observed instability of the U.S. inflation
and real economic activity during the 1970’s was due not to indeterminacy
of rational expectations equilibrium but to an absence of commitment on the
part of the Fed (see Chari, Christiano and Eichenbaum, 1997).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a discrete time
stochastic overlapping generations framework with staggered nominal price
setting. Equilibrium is characterized in Section 3. In Section 4 we study
the conditions for a unique bounded solution under a simple Taylor rule.
The implications for optimal monetary policy are derived and described in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 An Optimizing IS-LM-AS Model
The objective of this Section is to provide an optimizing general equilibrium
model with overlapping generations and staggered price adjustment.
2.1 Consumers optimization
The demand-side of the economy is based on a discrete-time version of the
Yaari (1965)-Blanchard (1985) overlapping generations model, with no inter-
generational bequest motive8. Three kind of extensions are made. First, the
model includes endogenous labor-leisure and money holding choices. Accord-
ing to Sidrauski (1965) and Brock (1975), money enters the utility function
since it provides transaction services9. Second, the economy is characterized
by a continuum of consumption goods supplied by monopolistically compet-
itive firms10. Third, individuals face uncertainty not only on the duration of
their lives, but also on the future time paths of the economic variables. This
extension allows us to outline a stochastic macroeconomic model suitable for
the evaluation of monetary policy.
All agents have identical preferences, face the same, constant probability
of death ϑ in each period, and there is no population growth. Each good is
produced in a number of varieties or brands indexed by j and defined over
8For a discrete-time version of the Yaari-Blanchard model, see Frenkel and Razin
(1986).
9A monetary version of the Blanchard-Yaari model was first developed by Marini and
van der Ploeg (1988). For a discrete-time version, see Cushing (1999).
10A multi-goods monetary version of the Yaari-Blanchard framework allowing for the
existence of nominal rigidities can be found in Leith andWren-Lewis (2000). For a discrete-
time version extended to the open economy, see Smets and Wouters (2002).
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the range [0,1]. Each brand is an imperfect substitute in consumption for
all other brands, with constant elasticity of substitution θ > 1. Following
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977), the consumption index of goods at time t for the
representative agent born at time s ≤ t is defined as
cs,t =
[∫ 1
0
cs,t (j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
, (1)
where cs,t(j) denotes consumption of brand j. The utility-based price of a
consumption bundle of produced goods, denoted by Pt, is derived as
11
Pt =
[∫ 1
0
Pt (j)
1−θ dj
] 1
1−θ
. (2)
As usual, the intratemporal individual optimization yields the demand for
each brand j as a function of the relative price of j and total consumption
of goods:
cs,t (j) =
[
Pt (j)
Pt
]−θ
cs,t. (3)
The objective of the representative agent is to maximize the expected utility
Et
∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t (1− ϑ)τ−t
[
log cs,τ + χ log
ms,τ
Pτ
+ κ log (1− ls,τ )
]
, (4)
subject to the flow budget constraint
ms,t + bs,t ≤ [ms,t−1 + (1 + it−1) bs,t−1] (1− ϑ)−1
+ws,tls,t + zs,t − ts,t −
∫ 1
0
Pt (j) cs,t (j) dj,
(5)
where all parameters are positive, 0 < β < 1 represents the subjective dis-
count factor, ls,t, ms,t, bs,t, ws,t, zs,t, ts,t denote labor effort, nominal money
balances, holdings of riskless one-period bonds with a nominal interest rate
it, the nominal wage rate, the share in the profits of firms, and lump-sum net
taxes of an individual born at time s, respectively. Our timing convention
has ms,t and bs,t as agent’s nominal balances and bonds accumulated during
period t and carried over into period t + 1. The short term nominal rate
it is paid at beginning of period t + 1 and is known at time t. Note that
the flow budget constraint incorporates the return on the insurance contract
11The utility-based price index Pt is defined as the minimum expenditure required to
buy one unit of the composite good cs,t, given the prices of the brands.
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as modelled by Blanchard (1985)12, (1− ϑ)−1. The effective discount factor
of consumers is given by β (1− ϑ). Labor income, the share of profits and
lump-sum net taxes are assumed to be equally distributed across agents.
The solution to the individual intertemporal maximizing problem yields
the Euler equation and the efficiency conditions on labor supply and money
demand choices, respectively:
1
Ptcs,t
= β (1 + it)Et
(
1
Pt+1cs,t+1
)
, (6)
κ
cs,t
1− ls,t =
ws,t
Pt
, (7)
ms,t
Pt
= χ
(1 + it)
it
cs,t. (8)
Define now the variable
Qt,t+1 (s) = β
Pt
Pt+1
cs,t
cs,t+1
, (9)
that can be interpreted as the stochastic discount rate of the representative
agent of generation s. Comparing (9) with (6) we obtain
EtQt,t+1 (s) =
1
1 + it
for each s ∈ (−∞, t]. (10)
In the optimum the flow budget constraint (5) holds with equality in each pe-
riod. We impose a transversality condition precluding private agents’ Ponzi-
game:
lim
τ→∞
EtQt,τ (s) (1− ϑ)τ−(t+1) [ms,τ + (1 + iτ ) bs,τ ] = 0, (11)
where Qt,τ (s) =
∏τ
k=t+1Qk−1,k (s). Solving (9) forward, using the budget
constraint and imposing the no-Ponzi-game condition, individual consump-
tion can be written as a fraction of total wealth:
Ptcs,t = Ψ
{
[ms,t−1 + (1 + it−1) bs,t−1] (1− ϑ)−1 + hs,t
}
, (12)
where Ψ = [1− β (1− ϑ)] /1+χ is the propensity to consume out of wealth,
and hs,t is human capital, defined as
hs,t = Et
∞∑
τ=t
Qt,τ (s) (1− ϑ)τ−t (ws,τ ls,τ + zs,τ − ts,τ ) . (13)
12A perfect insurance market inherits consumers financial wealth contingent on their
death and redistributes this in proportion to financial wealth. As a result, zero profits in
the insurance industry imply that the gross return on the insurance contract is given by
(1− ϑ)−1.
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2.1.1 Aggregation
Aggregate values are the sum across cohorts, weighted by their respective
sizes, and thus are defined as
Xt =
t∑
s=−∞
ϑ (1− ϑ)t−s xs,t, (14)
where xs,t indicates the corresponding individual variable.
After aggregation over all the cohorts of consumers, we obtain the aggre-
gate budget constraint, the aggregate consumption function, the aggregate
labor supply and the aggregate money demand, respectively:
Mt +Bt =Mt−1 + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +WtLt + Zt − Tt − PtCt, (15)
PtCt = Ψ [Mt−1 + (1 + it−1)Bt−1 +Ht] , (16)
κ
Ct
1− Lt =
Wt
Pt
, (17)
Mt
Pt
= χ
(1 + it)
it
Ct. (18)
Using (15) into (16) yields the dynamic equation for consumption,
Et {Qt,t+1Pt+1Ct+1} = βPtCt − ΓEt {Qt,t+1 [Mt + (1 + it)Bt]} , (19)
where Γ = [ϑ/ (1− ϑ)] Ψ. Aggregate consumption is a function not only of
expected consumption, but also of aggregate non-human wealth.
2.2 The demand for goods
Private demand for differentiated good j is obtained by aggregating (3) across
individuals:
Ct (j) =
[
Pt (j)
Pt
]−θ
Ct. (20)
We assume that government spending, Gt, is allocated amongst differentiated
consumption goods in the same manner as individuals’ consumption:
Gt =
[∫ 1
0
gt (j)
θ−1
θ dj
] θ
θ−1
. (21)
It follows that the demand for brand j is
Yt (j) =
[
Pt (j)
Pt
]−θ
Yt, (22)
where aggregate demand for the composite good is Yt = Ct +Gt.
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2.3 Firms optimization and price setting
The supply-side of the economy has a continuum of monopolistic firms, in-
dexed by j, each producing a differentiated product j. Each firm j faces a
linear production technology,
Yt (j) = AtLt (j) , (23)
where At is an exogenous technological parameter. Following Calvo (1983),
nominal price rigidity is modelled by allowing random intervals between price
changes. Each period a firm adjusts its price with probability 1−φ and keeps
its price fixed with probability φ. The adjustment probability is independent
across time and across firms. Firms that do not adjust prices stand ready to
adjust output to meet demand (assuming the participation constraint that
they operate in a region with a non-negative net markup). In either case,
choosing labor to minimize costs conditional on output yields
MCnt =
Wt
At
, (24)
whereMCnt denotes the nominal marginal cost, that is identical across firms.
The optimal pricing decision of a firm able to revise its price in period t
is to choose the price Pt (j) to maximize the following objective:
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=t
φτ−tQt,τZτ (j)
}
, (25)
where Zτ (j) denotes nominal profits from the sale of good j given by
13
Zτ = YτP
θ
τ
[
Pt (j)
1−θ −MCnτ Pt (j)−θ
]
. (26)
The first order condition for the optimal price is
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=t
φτ−tQt,τYτP θτ
[
(1− θ)Pt (j)−θ + θMCnτ Pt (j)−θ−1
]}
= 0. (27)
Multiplying (27) by Pt (j), dividing by (1− θ) and then simplifying we obtain
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=t
φτ−tQt,τYτP θτ [Pt (j)− µMCnτ ]
}
= 0, (28)
13The factor φτ−t multiplying the stochastic discount factor indicates the probability
that price Pt (j) will still be charged in period τ .
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where µ = θ
θ−1 is the equilibrium gross markup. Condition (28) implies that
firms set their price equal to a markup over a weighted average of expected
future nominal marginal costs.
In the symmetric equilibrium each producer choosing a new price Pt (j)
in period t will choose the same new price Pt (j) and the same level of output
Yt (j). Then, the price index follows a law of motion given by
Pt =
[
φ (Pt−1)
1−θ + (1− φ)Pt (j)1−θ
]1/1−θ
. (29)
2.4 Government budget constraint
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget constraint each period:
Tt + (Mt −Mt−1) = PtGt. (30)
For simplicity, let us set Gτ = G¯ ≥ 0 for all τ ≥ t, in what follows.
3 Equilibrium
In this Section, we characterize the equilibrium conditions. Specifically, in the
aggregate, the nominal money supply must equal nominal money demand,
and bonds must be zero in net supply:
Bt =
t∑
s=−∞
ϑ (1− ϑ)t−s bs,t = 0. (31)
Given these asset market clearing conditions, one can derive the aggregate
global goods market clearing condition. Specifically, (15), (30) and (31)
together imply the equilibrium requirement that
Ct + G¯ = Yt =
Wt
Pt
Lt +
Zt
Pt
. (32)
After combining the aggregate labor supply (17), the costs minimization
condition (24), the equilibrium relation (32) and the aggregate production
function,
Yt = AtLt, (33)
the real marginal cost, MCt, takes the following form:
MCt = κ
Yt − G¯
At − Yt . (34)
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Condition (34) states that the real marginal cost depends positively on output
and negatively on the exogenous technological parameter.
To close the model the behavior of prices and monetary policy must be
specified. Section 3.1 examines the global solution under flexible prices. Sec-
tion 3.2 characterizes the case of nominal rigidities, for which it is necessary a
log-linear approximation of the global system around a deterministic steady
state.
3.1 Flexible price equilibrium
Under flexible prices (φ = 0) the firm adjusts each period. In particular, it
will choose the price for its differentiated good as a constant markup over
marginal cost:
Pt (j)
Pt
= µMCt. (35)
Since the symmetric equilibrium implies that all firms choose the same price
(Pt (j) /Pt = 1), the flexible price equilibrium is characterized by a constant
real marginal cost:
MCt =
1
µ
. (36)
Using (36) into (34) yields the natural level of output:
Y nt =
At + κµG¯
1 + κµ
. (37)
With flexible prices, output is determined independently of monetary factors.
3.2 Equilibrium dynamics under sticky prices
In order to obtain tractable solutions, in this section we develop log-linear ver-
sions of all equilibrium conditions under sticky prices around a non-stochastic
steady state. The deterministic steady state we consider is defined as follows.
3.2.1 Steady state
We refer to a zero inflation non-stochastic steady state where Pt = P¯ ,
(1 + it) = R¯, Wt = W¯ , At = A¯, Lt = L¯, Ct = C¯, Yt = Y¯ , Mt = M¯ ,
and Tt = T¯ . It is straightforward to show that this steady state is also the
flexible price non-stochastic steady state.
Specifically, from (17), (18), (19), (28), (30), (31), (32), and (33) it must
be that κC¯/
(
1− L¯) = W¯/P¯ , M¯/P¯ = χ (R¯/R¯− 1) C¯, Q¯ = 1/R¯, βR¯ =
10
1 + ΓM¯/P¯ C¯, MC = 1/µ, T¯ = G¯, B¯ = 0, Y¯ = C¯ + G¯. It should be noted
that in the general case in which ϑ, χ > 0 we have βR¯ > 1. Only in the
limiting cases of cashless economy (χ = 0) and/or infinite horizon (ϑ = 0)
the standard property, βR¯ = 1, must hold.
3.2.2 The linearized model
We now use the steady state defined above as the point around which to
log-linearize the model. We use lower case variables with an accent above to
denote log-deviations from the deterministic steady state.
On the demand side, log-linear approximations of goods market and
money market equilibrium conditions are given, respectively, by
yˆt = sccˆt, (38)
mˆt − pˆt = cˆt − ηıˆt, (39)
where sc =
(
Y¯ − G¯) /Y¯ , η = [1/ (R¯− 1)− 1], and ıˆt = log [(1 + it) / (1 + ı¯)] .
From (19) (after imposing the bonds market clearing condition (31)), aggre-
gate consumption evolves as
cˆt = −ıˆt + 1
1 + Φ
Etpit+1 +
1
1 + Φ
Etcˆt+1 +
Φ
1 + Φ
(mˆt − pˆt) , (40)
where Φ = ΓM¯/P¯ C¯, and pit+1 = log (Pt+1/Pt) is the inflation rate from t to
t+ 1.
On the supply side, approximation to the aggregate production function
(33) yields
yˆt = aˆt + lˆt. (41)
Aggregate supply is obtained combining log-linear versions of optimal price
setting (28) and of the price index (29):
pit = δm̂c+
β
1 + Φ
Etpit+1, (42)
where δ =
(1−φ)(1− φβ1+Φ)
φ
. Combining the log-linearized version of the relation
(34) involving the real marginal cost and the production function (41), one
obtains
m̂c = υxt, (43)
where υ = ( L¯
1−L¯ +
Y¯
Y¯−G¯) and xt = yˆt − yˆnt denotes the output gap, i.e., the
difference between output and the natural level.
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The system of equations has essentially the structure of an IS-LM-AS
system. Specifically, the IS relation can be obtained substituting (38) into
(40) and using the definition of output gap:
xt = −sc
(
ıˆt − 1
1 + Φ
Etpit+1
)
+
1
1 + Φ
Etxt+1+ sc
Φ
1 + Φ
(mˆt − pˆt)+ ζˆt, (44)
where ζˆt =
(
1
1+Φ
Etyˆ
n
t+1 − yˆnt
)
can be modelled as an exogenous disturbance
term. The LM is expressed by (39). The “New Keynesian” Phillips curve
can be derived substituting (43) into (42):
pit = λxt +
β
1 + Φ
Etpit+1, (45)
where λ = υδ.
It should be emphasized that, in the general case in which Φ > 0, the
LM is not recursive to the model since money appears directly in the struc-
tural equation describing aggregate demand determination. In particular,
the relevance of money for aggregate demand comes via a micro-founded real
balance effect: money is net wealth and tends to stimulate consumption.
How to close the model depends on the path for the nominal interest rate
implied by the monetary policy regime.
4 The Taylor Rule and Equilibrium Determi-
nacy
We now consider how the real balance effect may affect the conditions for
rational expectations equilibrium determinacy under an interest rate rule of
the Taylor-type, given by
ıˆt = ρ+ φpipit + φxxt, (46)
where ρ is an exogenous intercept, and φpi, φx are constant policy coefficients,
indicating the “strength” of monetary policy14. We assume that φpi and φx
are non-negative, with at least one strictly positive. A rational expectations
equilibrium is a set of processes {xτ , piτ , (mˆτ − pˆτ )}∞τ=t satisfying (39), (44)
14It is well-known that Taylor has found this kind of interest rate rule as a good char-
acterization of U.S. monetary policy, as discussed in a number of recent papers (see, e.g.,
Taylor, 1993, 1999; Judd and Rudebush, 1998).
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and (45) each period, for any given specification of the interest rate policy
rule (46) and for a given process
{
ζˆτ
}∞
τ=t
.
In order to analyze the issue of stability of equilibrium, it is convenient to
use the LM relation (39) to eliminate real balances from the intertemporal
IS equation (44), yielding
xt = −sc [(1 + γ) (ˆıt − rˆnt )− Etpit+1] + Etxt+1, (47)
where γ = Φ(1 + η) and rˆnt = [sc (1 + γ)]
−1 {Etyˆnt+1 − yˆnt } represents the de-
viation of the Wicksellian “natural interest rate” from the value consistent
with the defined zero-inflation steady state15. Expression (47) can be inter-
preted as follows. The real balance effect makes even a one-for-one rise in
both expected inflation and the nominal interest rate contractionary. This
extra-effect on aggregate demand is implied by the reduction in real money
demand when an increase in the nominal interest rate occurs.
We now substitute the policy rule (46) into (47), and represent the equilib-
rium system involving the two endogenous variables xt and pit in the following
compact form: (
xt
pit
)
= A
(
Et {xt+1}
Et {pit+1}
)
+B (rˆnt − ρ) , (48)
where
A =
1
1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx
(
1 sc
[
1− β(1+γ)φpi
1+Φ
]
λ scλ+
β[1+sc(1+γ)φx]
1+Φ
)
,
and B= 1
1+sc(1+γ)λφpi+sc(1+γ)φx
(
sc (1 + γ) sc (1 + γ)λ
)′
. Following Blan-
chard and Khan (1980), a necessary and sufficient condition for the sys-
tem (48) to exhibit a unique bounded solution is that the number of non-
predetermined endogenous variables equal the number of roots of A that lie
inside the unit circle; otherwise the equilibrium will be indeterminate. Since
both xt and pit are free, we can state the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Let φpi, φx ≥ 0, with at least one strictly positive. Under
interest rate rules of the form (46) the necessary and sufficient condition for
15To obtain the natural rate of interest, it should be noted from the Phillips curve that
output equals its natural rate (xt = 0) at all times if pit = 0 at all times. Using these
paths for inflation and output into the IS relation (after substituting the LM curve), it is
straightforward to derive (47) (for this procedure, see Woodford, 2003).
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a rational expectations equilibrium to be unique is that
φpi +
(
1− β
1+Φ
)
λ
φx >
1
1 + γ
. (49)
Proof. See Appendix A.
The left-hand side of condition (49) represents the long-run increase in
the nominal interest rate prescribed by the policy rule (46) for each unit
permanent increase in the inflation rate. It’s clear that condition (49) does
not verify what Woodford (2001, 2003) calls the “Taylor principle”16: in the
event of a permanent one percent rise in inflation, it is not necessary that the
cumulative increase in the nominal interest rate be more than one percent.
A “passive” monetary policy, that is, a policy that underreacts to inflation
by raising the nominal interest rate by less than the observed increase in
inflation, is feasible also in the long run, provided that (49) is satisfied.
The intuition for this result is as follows. If monetary policy is passive, a
deviation of expected inflation from the rational expectations value leads
to a decrease in the real interest rate which not necessarily increases the
output gap through (47) and then inflation through (45). In fact, the rise in
the nominal interest rate implied by the rule (46) increases the opportunity-
cost of holding real money balances and therefore tends to reduce aggregate
demand through the monetary wealth effect. If condition (49) is satisfied, the
real balance effect operates as an “automatic stabilizer”, leading the economy
towards the unique rational expectations value.
According to estimates of the rule (46) for the U.S. monetary policy (see,
e.g, Clarida, Gal`ı and Gertler, 1999; Taylor, 1999), monetary policy has
been significantly “passive” during the pre-Volcker era (1960:1-79:4)17: Fed-
eral Reserve policy tended systematically to accommodate rather than fight
increases in inflation. Within the standard “New Keynesian” setup, these es-
timates suggest that equilibrium was indeterminate in the pre-Volcker regime
(see Taylor, 1999; Woodford, 2003). We have shown that the real balance
effect implies that the pre-Volcker regime could have been well determinate.
5 Optimal Interest Rate Rules
In this Section, we investigate the implications for optimal monetary policy
design. In particular, we discuss optimal interest rate rules, both under
16See also Bullard and Mitra (2002).
17In particular, Taylor (1999) estimates for this period φpi = 0.813 and φx = 0.252.
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discretion and under commitment.
In order to introduce a short run trade-off in monetary policy making be-
tween output and inflation, we add an exogenous shock, ut, to the aggregate
supply curve:
pit = λxt +
β
1 + Φ
Etpit+1 + ut. (50)
Following Clarida, Gal`ı and Gertler (1999), the disturbance term can be
interpreted as a “cost push shock”, representing anything apart from the
output gap that affects marginal costs. We assume that this shock obeys the
following stationary first order process:
ut = νut−1 + εt, (51)
with 0 < ν < 1, and where εt is white noise.
The central bank’s objective function is specified as
max−1
2
Et
{ ∞∑
τ=t
βτ−t
[
αx2τ + pi
2
τ
]}
, (52)
where the parameter α measures the relative weight on output deviations.
5.1 Optimal discretionary policy
Under discretion, the central bank re-optimizes each period and the optimum
is characterized by a “lean against the wind” policy:
xt = −λ
α
pit. (53)
Substituting the above optimality condition into (50) and solving forward
yields the following reduced forms for inflation and the output gap:
pit =
α
λ2 + α
(
1− βν
1+Φ
)ut, (54)
xt = − λ
λ2 + α
(
1− βν
1+Φ
)ut. (55)
Combining the IS relation (47) with the solutions for pit and xt, one obtains
the optimal feedback rule for the interest rate:
ıˆt = rˆ
n
t + φ
∗
piEtpit+1, (56)
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where φ∗pi =
1
1+γ
[
1 + λ(1−ν)
νscα
]
Q 1. The Taylor principle, according to which a
central bank should respond to increases in inflation with a more than one-
for-one increase in the nominal interest rate, is not optimal, in general, in
our framework. To summarize, we have:
Proposition 2 Under discretion, it is optimal to implement the Taylor prin-
ciple if the following condition is satisfied:
γ <
λ (1− ν)
νscα
. (57)
This condition is certainly verified in the limiting cases of cashless economies
and/or infinite horizon setups, in which Φ = 0 (hence γ = 0). By contrast,
if γ > λ(1−ν)
νσα
, the monetary wealth effect described above makes optimal for
the central bank to implement a passive monetary policy.
5.2 Optimal policy with commitment
Under commitment, the central bank chooses a binding state-contingent rule.
In what follows we distinguish between the ”constrained” and the ”uncon-
strained” commitment.
5.2.1 The “constrained” commitment
Consider the case in which the central bank commits itself to conduct mon-
etary policy according to a linear feedback rule on state variables. This
approach provides a simple way to clarify the difference of the case of com-
mitment relative to discretion. Specifically, under commitment to a feedback
rule of the kind xct = −ωut (ω > 0), it is possible to show that the optimal
interest rate is
ıˆt = rˆ
n
t + φ
∗c
pi Etpit+1, (58)
with φ∗cpi =
1
1+γ
[
1 + λ(1−ν)
νscα(1− βν1+Φ)
]
> φ∗pi. In this case, the central bank optimal
policy is to implement a more aggressive response to expected deviations
of inflation from target, due to an improved trade-off between output and
inflation. Thus we have:
Proposition 3 Under commitment to a linear policy rule of the kind xct =
−ωut (ω > 0), it is optimal to apply the Taylor principle if the following
condition holds:
γ <
λ (1− ν)
νscα
(
1− βν
1+Φ
) . (59)
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Hence, the main prediction of the model is that the Taylor principle is
more likely to be verified under a “constrained” commitment than under
discretion. This seems to suggest the idea that the observed instability of
the U.S. inflation and real economic activity during the 1970’s could be due
not to indeterminacy of rational expectations equilibrium but to an absence
of commitment on the part of the Fed, as argued by Chari, Christiano and
Eichenbaum (1997).
5.2.2 The “unconstrained” commitment
We now discuss the general solution for the optimal interest rate rule under
commitment, which can be derived as follows. In the first stage problem,
the central bank chooses a state contingent policy {xτ , piτ}∞τ=t in order to
maximize (52) subject to the aggregate supply curve (50), which holds in
every period τ ≥ t. The solution implies the following optimality conditions:
xτ =
1
1 + Φ
xτ−1 − λ
α
piτ , (60)
for each τ > t, and
xt = −λ
α
pit. (61)
Combining (60) with (47), one obtains the optimal interest rate rule:
ıˆt = rˆ
n
t +
1
1 + γ
[
1− λ
scα
]
Etpit+1 +
λΦ
scα (1 + γ) (1 + Φ)
pit. (62)
In the limiting cases of a cashless economy and/or infinite horizon (Φ, γ =
0), it is well known that this kind of rule involves indeterminacy, since the
coefficient associated with expected inflation is less than one18 (see Clarida,
Gal`ı and Gertler, 1999; Woodford, 1999). In Appendix B we show that
the presence of the real balance effect is not sufficient to make equilibrium
determinate.
6 Calibration
In order to evaluate the foregoing results we calibrate the model to quarterly
data. The baseline parameter configuration is summarized in Table 1.
18A further problem is that the optimal plan (60) and (61) is not time consistent, as
discussed by Clarida, Gal`ı and Gertler (1999).
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We let the steady state share of government spending in GDP be 0.2,
which is a conventional estimate of the share of government consumption for
the U.S.. The average M2 velocity, P¯ Y¯ /M¯ , is set equal to 0.425, consistent
with an annual value of 1.7. This is in line with estimates obtained for the
U.S. for the period 1960-199519. We set the steady state real interest rate
equal to 0.007 (i.e., 3 per cent per year). Following Leith and Wren-Lewis
(2001), the probability of death between two consecutive periods is set equal
to 0.015. This parameter can be interpreted as a measure of the individual
planning horizon.
The steady state fraction of time in employment is 1/3, according to the
standard eight hours working day. We calibrate the probability of keeping
the price fixed between two consecutive periods to be 0.85. This is consistent
with Gal`ı and Gertler (1999) estimates.
Furthermore, the cost push shock is assumed to have a standard devi-
ation and an autoregressive coefficient equal to 0.07 and 0.7, respectively.
The presence of a relatively high degree of persistence is consistent with the
estimates of Ireland (2002) obtained for the U.S. during the period 1948-2002.
The remainder of parameters are implied by the steady state relations
defined in Section 3.
In terms of condition (49), using the foregoing parameters it is straightfor-
ward to find equilibrium determinacy if and only if the nominal interest rate
increases more than 0.88 percentage points per percentage point long-run
increase in inflation.
In terms of optimal monetary policy, we now investigate how the “sign” of
optimal monetary policy (“active” or “passive”) is sensitive with respect to
small changes in the parameter values. In particular, we consider the effect
of a variation in the parameter reflecting the central bank relative weight on
output fluctuations, α. Impulse response functions to unit shocks are derived
using the toolkit provided by Gerali and Lippi (2003)20.
Figure 1 shows responses to a unit cost push shock in a discretionary
monetary policy regime with α = 0.05, the value reported by Rotemberg
and Woodford (1997). In this case, it is optimal to apply an active monetary
policy, since the real interest rate increases on impact. However, setting a
value of α = 1/3, in line with Broadbent and Barro (1997), one obtains the
optimality of a passive monetary policy (Figure 2). Under the previous value
19Data source is the Federal Reserve Bank of New York report “Un-
derstanding Open Market Operations”, downloadable from the website
http://www.newyorkfed.org/education/addpub/pdf/ch2.pdf. .
20Thank to the authors, the toolkit is downloadable from their homepages.
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of α, Figures 3 and 4 show that in the limit case of infinite horizon (ϑ = 0)
and in the case of “constrained” commitment, it is optimal to implement the
“Taylor principle”.
7 Conclusions
We have presented a “New Keynesian” setup with the presence of a monetary
wealth effect. This kind of extension makes the LM relation non recursive
to the equilibrium system. The main finding of the paper is that the micro-
founded real balance effect in the IS intertemporal relation has important
implications for the design of monetary policy rules. Specifically, we have
obtained the following results: (i) the “Taylor principle” relies on the strict
assumption of the traditional infinitely-lived representative agent model and
disappears as a necessary condition for equilibrium determinacy as soon as we
introduce an overlapping generations framework, through a rigorous version
of the real balance effect; (ii) this principle is implemented by the central bank
more likely under commitment (within a class of linear feedback rules on state
variables) rather than under discretion. The view that the pre-Volcker era
in the U.S. was not affected by equilibrium indeterminacy but characterized
by an absence of commitment on the part of the Fed has therefore sound
theoretical micro-foundations.
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Appendix A
Proof of Proposition 1
Consider the system (48). The characteristic polynomial of A can be
written as
P (ξ) = ξ2 − tr (A) + det (A) , (A.1)
where
tr (A) =
1 + scλ+
β[1+sc(1+γ)φx]
1+Φ
1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx
, (A.2)
and
det (A) =
scλ+
β[1+sc(1+γ)φx]
1+Φ
− scλ+ sc β(1+γ)λφpi1+Φ
[1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx]
2 . (A.3)
Conditions for equilibrium determinacy are
|det (A)| < 1, (A.4)
|−tr (A)| < 1 + det (A) . (A.5)
Rearranging (A.3) yields
|det (A)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
β
1+Φ
1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx
∣∣∣∣∣ . (A.6)
Condition (A.4) requires that
β
1 + Φ
< 1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx. (A.7)
Given our restrictions about the parameters φpi and φx, this is always verified.
Condition (A.5) requires that
1 + scλ+
β[1+sc(1+γ)φx]
1+Φ
1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx
< 1 +
β
1+Φ
1 + sc (1 + γ)λφpi + sc (1 + γ)φx
,
(A.8)
which is satisfied if and only if condition (49) holds.
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Appendix B
Equilibrium indeterminacy under the ”unconstrained” commitment
Combining (62) with (47) and (50), one can represent the equilibrium
dynamics with the system:(
xt
pit
)
= AC
(
Et {xt+1}
Et {pit+1}
)
+BCut, (B.1)
where
AC =
1
1 + λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
(
1 λ
α
[
1− Φβ
(1+Φ)2
]
λ β
1+Φ
+ λ
2
α
)
,
and BC =
1
1+ λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
(
− λΦ
α(1+Φ)
1
)′
. We have
tr (AC) =
1 + β
1+Φ
+ λ
2
α
1 + λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
, (B.2)
det (AC) =
β
1+Φ
1 + λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
. (B.3)
Conditions for equilibrium determinacy are given by (A.4) and (A.5), with
A replaced by AC. Condition (A.4) is always satisfied. Condition (A.5)
requires
1 + β
1+Φ
+ λ
2
α
1 + λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
< 1 +
β
1+Φ
1 + λ
2Φ
α(1+Φ)
, (B.4)
which is not verified.
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Table 1 - Baseline Parameter Values
Average Ratios
G¯/Y¯ = 0.2
C¯/Y¯ = 0.8
L¯ = 1/3
Baseline Parameter Values
R¯ = 1.007
ϑ = 0.015
φ = 0.85
Implied Parameter Values
χ = 0.02
β = 0.994
Φ = 0.001
γ = 0.14
Cost Push Shock
ν = 0.7
σ = 0.07
25
Figure 1: Inflation, Nominal Interest Rate, Output Gap, and Real Interest
Rate Following a Temporary Cost Push Shock: Optimal Monetary Policy
under Discretion (α = 0.05)
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Figure 2: Inflation, Nominal Interest Rate, Output Gap, and Real Interest
Rate Following a Temporary Cost Push Shock: Optimal Monetary Policy
under Discretion (α = 1/3)
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Figure 3: Inflation, Nominal Interest Rate, Output Gap, and Real Interest
Rate Following a Temporary Cost Push Shock: Optimal Monetary Policy
under Discretion (α = 1/3) in the Infinite Horizon Limit Case (ϑ = 0)
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Figure 4: Inflation, Nominal Interest Rate, Output Gap, and Real Interest
Rate Following a Temporary Cost Push Shock: Optimal Monetary Policy
under the “Constrained” Commitment (α = 1/3)
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